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Chapter 7
A New Security Architecture 
to Improve Business Agility
Reality and Rhetoric
An organization’s ability to learn, and translate that learning into action 
rapidly, is the ultimate competitive advantage.
—Jack Welch
Some Star Trek episodes feature suspense-filled battles in which adversaries use 
sophisticated phase-shifting weapons that can be rapidly adjusted until they find a way 
to penetrate static force-field defenses. For a beleaguered starship, the only effective 
response is to use similarly adaptable and fast-changing shields.
As information security professionals, we also need extremely agile defenses that 
can be quickly adapted to meet new demands. Attackers are continually adapting, and 
defenders also need to continually adapt. But rapidly evolving threats are only part of 
the challenge. The technology landscape is changing just as fast due to trends like IT 
consumerization.
As Intel’s information risk and security group considers the future, we realize that we 
need to radically change our approach in order to face the challenges ahead and support 
the Protect to Enable mission. We need a more agile security architecture that can quickly 
learn and adapt to new challenges as they emerge. Because the environment is changing 
so quickly, in ways we cannot control, it’s impossible to predict all the future challenges 
we’ll need to face. We need an architecture that can learn to manage what we don’t know.
This flexibility will help the business move more quickly, by enabling us to rapidly 
adopt new technologies and emerging usage models while continuing to provide security 
in the ever-evolving threat landscape. A learning system is harder to defeat because it can 
more quickly adapt in response to new attacks.
After intense brainstorming sessions, our information risk and security team devised 
a new security architecture. This architecture is our implementation of the Protect to 
Enable strategy.
In this chapter, I’ll provide a high-level overview of the architecture and describe 
how it meets some key security challenges. Though the overview is based on our work 
at Intel, I believe that this is a novel approach to enterprise security that may be valuable 
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to many other organizations facing these universal challenges. My conversations with 
peers at other companies have validated this view. Many of them are considering similar 
strategies and in some cases have begun implementing them.
We are implementing this architecture across Intel’s IT environment in a radical 
five-year redesign of our information security technology. Even while the implementation 
is in progress, the new architecture has already delivered results by helping us provide 
innovative solutions to challenging use cases while actually reducing risk. Intel IT has 
published more detailed descriptions covering several aspects of the architecture  
(Ben-Shalom et al. 2011, Sunderland and Chandramouly 2011, Gutierrez et al. 2012),  
and we expect to continue to publish information in the future.
A key aspect of the architecture is that it provides more flexible, dynamic, and 
granular security controls than traditional enterprise security models. This helps us 
accommodate usage models such as bring-your-own-device (BYOD). We can provide 
users with different levels of access depending on factors such as the devices they are 
using and their location. To achieve this, the technology dynamically adjusts a user’s 
access privileges as the level of risk changes. For example, an employee should have 
more limited access to our systems when using a less-secure device than when using a 
hardened, fully managed enterprise-class system.
The new architecture greatly improves threat management. As new risks appear, we 
need to be able to quickly recognize which ones we can mitigate, learn as much as we 
can, and take action as quickly as possible. At Intel, we use many information sources 
to gain an understanding of the risks. Collectively, these sources provide a continuous 
feed of collective intelligence that we can use to learn, adapt, and evolve. As I described 
in Chapter 6, we use emerging threat analysis to help us anticipate future risks. But 
our architecture also assumes that compromise is inevitable and focuses heavily on 
survivability. We are applying security monitoring and business intelligence to analyze 
patterns of behavior and detect anomalies that are symptoms of attacks. With this 
knowledge, we can further investigate and apply mitigation where necessary. In the 
future, this approach could be extended by automatically taking corrective action where it 
makes sense to do so.
Business Trends and Architecture Requirements
Before diving into the specifics of the architecture, I’ll recap some of the key business 
and technology trends, focusing on how they drive the need for specific capabilities in 
security technology.
IT Consumerization
As I discussed in Chapter 5, consumerization is a major IT theme with ever-broadening 
impact. It includes several trends, including the adoption of new applications and 
support for consumer devices.
Many of Intel’s highly mobile employees want to use their own consumer devices, 
such as smartphones and tablets, for work. This increases productivity by enabling 
employees to collaborate and access information from anywhere, at any time. To support 
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this, we provide access to corporate e-mail and other applications from employee-owned 
smartphones and tablets.
Some people believe that in the future, all devices will be consumer-owned, and that 
enterprises will no longer purchase devices for their users. I believe this might be the case 
in some work environments, but I doubt that it will suit all organizations. For a company 
providing call center services, with most employees working from home, it might make 
sense that employees exclusively use their own personal systems for work. But this 
strategy would be more risky for a financial services company whose employees handle 
highly sensitive information that’s subject to extensive regulatory requirements.
Nevertheless, the consumerization trend continues to grow at Intel and other 
organizations. Accordingly, we’ll need to provide employees with a level of access to Intel 
resources from an expanding continuum of client devices, some of which have much 
weaker security controls than today’s enterprise clients (see sidebar).
CONSUMerIZING eNterprISe It aND “eNterprISING” 
the CONSUMer
Discussions of it consumerization tend to draw a clear line between business 
devices that can be managed and trusted, and personal consumer devices that are 
essentially unmanaged and untrusted.
however, not all consumer devices are created equal. From a security standpoint, 
it may be more valuable to think about a device’s capabilities than to categorize it 
based solely on whether it’s marketed as an enterprise device or a personal device. 
the security of a device depends on the inherent features of the hardware, operating 
system, and applications, and on whether it enables us to add further security and 
manageability capabilities that mitigate the risks of enterprise use.
as the variety of consumer devices, such as smartphones, continues to expand, 
users may choose from dozens of models with different levels of security 
capabilities. greater security and manageability means that it can place greater 
trust in the device and provide a correspondingly greater level of access to 
enterprise resources.
extending this idea further, the information security group could evaluate the 
security of available consumer devices and provide guidance about the level of 
enterprise access that users will be allowed with each device. users may prefer to 
buy a more secure device because it will provide them more access. with greater  
access, they can use the device for more of their daily work activities. this ability in 
turn enables them to be more productive.
At the same time, employees increasingly expect to have available to them at work 
the types of consumer services and cloud applications that they use in their personal 
lives. These include social computing applications such as blogs and wikis, video-sharing 
sites, and file-sharing services.
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We need a security architecture that enables us to more quickly support new devices 
and provide access to a greater range of applications and data, without increasing risk. We 
need to be able to dynamically adjust the levels of access we provide and the monitoring 
we perform, depending on the security controls of the client device.
New Business Needs
Nearly all companies now rely on a growing network of business partners, and conduct 
many of their interactions with those partners online. Intel is no exception—we are 
developing an increasing number of systems for online collaboration with business 
partners. Also, like many companies, Intel is expanding into new markets through both 
organic growth and acquisitions. Because of these business trends, most organizations 
need to provide access to a broader range of users, many of whom are not employees. 
Many also need to be able to smoothly integrate acquired companies and provide them 
with access to resources. In general, we need to quickly provide new users access while 
minimizing risk and providing selective, controlled access only to the resources  
they need.
Cloud Computing
Most organizations are already using cloud services in some form to achieve benefits 
such as greater agility and lower cost. Like many companies, Intel IT is implementing a 
private cloud based on virtualized infrastructure, and we are also using external cloud 
services for noncritical applications. In the future, we expect greater use of hybrid clouds 
that use both internal and external resources.
This trend means that IT services at many organizations will be provided by a 
mixture of traditional and cloud-based internal and external services. During a typical 
day, employees may access a variety of different services, some of which are internal and 
some external. Ultimately, they should be able to easily move between these services 
without needing to log in multiple times or even know where the services are located.
Securing access to cloud-based services presents challenges that aren’t easily 
addressed using conventional security controls. In cloud environments, systems and 
their data are virtualized and may migrate dynamically to different network locations. 
This makes it difficult to effectively restrict access using traditional security controls such 
as firewalls, which rely on fixed locations of systems and a more static nature of the data. 
We need much more granular and dynamic controls that are linked to the resources 
themselves rather than just their network location.
Changing Threat Landscape
The threat landscape is evolving rapidly. Increasingly, attackers are taking a stealthy 
approach, creating malware that quietly gains access and attempts to remain undetected 
in order to maintain access over time. As the number of threats increases and new types 
of malware emerge, we need to assume that compromise is inevitable.
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Traditional enterprise security architectures have relied largely on preventative 
controls such as firewalls located at the network perimeter. However, our primary focus 
has shifted to providing controlled access to a broader range of users and devices, rather 
than simply preventing access. In addition, the continually changing threat landscape 
makes it necessary to assume that compromise will occur. Once attackers have gained 
access to the environment, the preventative controls they have bypassed are worthless. 
Although these perimeter controls will continue to have some value, we need tools 
that increase the ability to survive and recover once attackers have gained access to the 
environment.
Privacy and Regulatory Requirements
The growing emphasis on privacy requirements and the increasingly complex regulatory 
environment have many implications for the way we manage information. Some 
regulations create the need for more control over where information is stored and require 
specific levels of protection and tracking. Our architecture must provide this assurance, 
allowing us to build a high-security environment and access controls appropriate for the 
protection of highly regulated information.
New Architecture
To meet these rapidly changing requirements, we need a highly flexible and dynamic 
architecture. The architecture should enable us to more quickly adopt new devices, use 
models, and capabilities; provide security across an increasingly complex environment; 
and adapt to a changing threat landscape. At Intel, we formed a team chartered with 
designing this architecture from scratch, taking a fresh approach to enterprise security, 
then determining how to implement this new architecture across our existing IT 
environment.
Key goals include helping increase employee productivity while supporting new 
business requirements and technology trends, including IT consumerization, cloud 
computing, and access by a broader range of users. At the same time, the architecture 
is designed to reduce our attack surface and improve survivability—even as the threat 
landscape grows in complexity and maliciousness.
The architecture moves away from the traditional enterprise trust model, which is 
binary and static. With this traditional model, a user is in general either granted or denied 
access to all resources; once granted, the level of access remains constant. The new 
architecture replaces this with a dynamic, multitiered trust model that exercises more fine-
grained control over identity and access control, including access to specific resources. 
This means that for an individual user, the level of access provided may vary dynamically 
over time, depending on a variety of factors—such as whether the user is accessing the 
network from a highly secure managed device or an untrusted unmanaged device.
The architecture’s flexibility allows us to take advantage of trust that’s built into 
devices at a hardware level, as well as trust in applications and services. Increasingly, 
devices will include hardware-enforced security designed to ensure the integrity of 
the applications and data on the device. The architecture takes this into account when 
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determining whether to allow access to specific resources—a more-trusted platform 
can be allowed greater access than a less-trusted one. The architecture is based on four 
cornerstones:
•	 Trust Calculation. This unique element of the architecture 
handles user identity and access management, dynamically 
determining whether a user should be granted access to specific 
resources and, if so, what type of access should be granted. The 
calculation is based on factors such as the user’s client device 
and location, the type of resources requested, and the security 
controls that are available.  
•	 Security Zones. The infrastructure is divided into multiple security 
zones that provide different levels of protection. These range 
from trusted network zones containing critical data, with tightly 
controlled access, to untrusted zones containing less-valuable 
data and allowing broader access. Communication between 
zones is controlled and monitored; this helps ensure users can 
only access the resources for which they have been authorized 
and prevents compromises from spreading across multiple zones.
•	 Balanced Controls. To increase flexibility and the ability to 
recover from a successful attack, the model emphasizes the need 
for a balance of detective and corrective controls in addition 
to preventative controls such as firewalls. This includes a focus 
on business intelligence analytical tools to detect anomalous 
patterns that may indicate attempts to compromise the 
environment.
•	 User and Data Perimeters. Recognizing that protecting the 
enterprise network boundary is no longer adequate, we need 
to treat users and data as additional security perimeters and 
protect them accordingly. This means an increased focus on user 
awareness as well as data protection built into the information 
assets.
I’ll describe each of the four cornerstones in more detail.
Trust Calculation
The trust calculation plays an essential role in providing the flexibility required to support 
a rapidly expanding number of devices and usage models. The calculation enables us to 
dynamically adjust users’ levels of access, depending on factors such as the devices and 
networks they are currently using.
It calculates trust in the interaction between the person or device requesting access 
(source) and the information requested (destination). The calculation consists of a source 
score and a destination score, taking into account the controls available to mitigate risk. 
As shown in Figure 7-1, the result of this calculation determines whether the user is 
allowed access and the type of access provided. 
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Figure 7-1. Trust calculation. Source: Intel Corporation, 2012
Source Score
Trust in the source, or requestor, is calculated based on the following factors:
•	 Who. The identity of the user or service requesting access  
and our confidence level in the authentication mechanism 
used—how confident are we that users are who they say  
they are?
•	 What. The device type, its control capabilities, our ability to 
validate those controls, and the extent to which Intel IT manages 
the device.
•	 Where. The user’s or service’s location. For example, a user who is 
inside the Intel enterprise network is more trusted than the same 
user connecting through a public network. There may also be 
other considerations, such as the geographical region where the 
user is located.
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Destination Score
This is calculated based on the same three factors, but these are considered from the 
perspective of the destination—the information the source is trying to access:
•	 Who. The application that stores the requested data. Some 
applications can enforce greater controls, such as enterprise 
rights management (ERM), and therefore provide a higher level  
of trust.
•	 What. The sensitivity of the information being requested 
and other considerations, such as our ability to recover it if 
compromise occurs.
•	 Where. The security zone in which the data resides.
Available Controls
The trust calculation also takes into account the security controls available for the zone. 
If the only controls available are controls that simply block or allow access, we might 
deny access due to lack of other options. However, if we have extensive preventative 
controls with highly granular levels of access, detailed logs, and highly tuned security 
monitoring—as well as the ability to recover from or correct problems—then we can 
allow access without creating additional risk.
Calculating Trust
The trust calculation adds the source score and the destination score to arrive at an initial 
trust level. The available controls are then considered to make a final decision about 
whether access is allowed and, if so, how. This calculation is performed by a logical entity 
called a policy decision point (PDP), which is part of the authentication infrastructure and 
makes access control decisions based on a set of policies.
Based on the results of this calculation, the PDP makes a decision, allocating a trust 
level that determines whether the user can access the requested resource and the type of 
access that is allowed. Broadly, the decision will fall into one of the following categories:
Allow access•	
Deny access•	
Allow access with limitations or mitigation•	
This trust calculation therefore allows us to dynamically apply granular control 
over access to specific resources. For example, employees using IT-managed devices 
with additional hardware features such as a trusted platform module (TPM), global 
positioning system (GPS), and full disk encryption would be allowed access to more 
resources than when using devices that lack those features.
Employees directly connected to the Intel network typically get greater access than 
when using a public network. If we are unable to verify the location of a high-security 
device such as a managed PC, we would allow less access.
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The trust calculation also can be used for more fine-grained distinctions between 
different device models. For example, we could provide different levels of access based 
on smartphone manageability, hardware-enabled authentication and encryption, and 
installed applications.
We anticipate situations in which the trust level is not adequate to allow any access, 
but there is still a business requirement to allow a connection or transaction to occur. In 
these conditions, the result of the trust calculation could be a decision to allow access 
with limitations or with compensating controls that mitigate the risk. For example, a 
user might be allowed read-only access or might be permitted access only if additional 
monitoring controls are in place.
We’re implementing this trust calculation across Intel’s environment. Today, the 
trust calculation makes decisions based on information gathered from components at 
multiple levels of the infrastructure, such as network gateways, access points, and user 
devices. Once the trust calculation mechanism is in place, we can extend it to include 
information from a broader range of sources. For example, the calculation might take into 
account the level of hardware-enforced security features built into the user’s device. This 
would allow us to provide greater access to users who have more-trusted devices.
The trust calculation can be used to determine access to internal systems by business 
partners as well as employees. Let’s say we’re collaborating with another company on 
the design of a new product. An engineer at that company wants access to a specific 
document. We can add a variety of criteria to the trust calculation for deciding whether to 
grant access. Did the engineer’s request originate within the business partner’s enterprise 
network? Is it consistent with the type of request that we’d expect from an engineer? If so, 
we have a higher level of trust in the requestor.
If we cannot establish an adequate level of trust in the user’s device, but other factors 
provide enough confidence to grant access, we might provide one-time access for a 
specific job. We could do this by allowing a document to be downloaded, but only within 
a container that ensures the document is completely removed from the user’s device once 
the job is completed.
Longer term, the trust calculation could become a mechanism that is used to 
determine access to both internal and external resources. Intel IT, like many companies, 
is using some external cloud-based applications, while developing an internal private 
cloud for most applications. In the future, we anticipate greater use of a hybrid-cloud 
approach. The trust calculation could be used to manage identity and access for both.
Security Zones
The architecture divides the IT environment into multiple security zones. These range from 
untrusted zones that provide access to less valuable data and less important systems to 
trusted zones containing critical data and resources.
Because the higher-trust zones contain more valuable assets, they are protected with 
a greater depth and range of controls, and we restrict access to fewer types of devices and 
applications, as shown in Figure 7-2. However, devices allowed access to higher-trust 
zones also have more power—they may be able to perform actions that are not allowed 
within lower-trust zones, such as creating or modifying enterprise data.
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Aligning the infrastructure in this fashion provides an excellent way to right-size 
security controls so that security resources are utilized effectively. It also helps improve 
the user experience by enabling employees to choose from a wider range of devices, such 
as smartphones, for lower-risk activities.
Access to zones is determined by the results of the trust calculation and is controlled 
by policy enforcement points (PEPs). PEPs may include a range of controls, including 
firewalls, application proxies, intrusion detection and prevention systems, authentication 
systems, and logging systems.
Communication between zones is tightly restricted, monitored, and controlled. 
We separate zones by locating them on different physical or virtual LANs; PEPs control 
communication between zones. This means that if one zone is compromised, we can 
prevent the problem from spreading to other zones or increase our chances of detection 
if it does spread. In addition, we can use PEP controls, such as application proxies, to 
provide devices and applications in lower-trust zones with limited, controlled access to 
specific resources in higher-trust zones when required.
The architecture includes three primary categories of security zone: untrusted, 
selective, and trusted. Within the zones, there are multiple subzones.
Untrusted Zones
These zones host data and services (or the interfaces to them) that can be exposed 
to untrusted entities. This allows us to provide widespread access to a limited set 
of resources from non-managed consumer devices, without increasing the risk to 
higher-value resources located in other zones. Untrusted zones might provide access 
to enterprise resources, such as corporate e-mail and calendars, or they might simply 
provide Internet access.
Figure 7-2. As the value of an asset increases, the depth and span of controls increase, 
while the number of allowed devices, applications, and locations decrease. Source: Intel 
Corporation, 2012
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These zones are regarded as “shark tanks,” with a high risk of attack and compromise. 
Therefore, detective and corrective controls are needed to mitigate this risk. These 
controls might include a high level of monitoring to detect suspect activity and correction 
capabilities such as dynamic removal of user privilege.
We anticipate a need to provide controlled access from these zones to resources 
in higher-trust zones. For example, an employee using an untrusted device might be 
allowed limited, read-only access to customer data located in a trusted zone; or their 
device might need access to a directory server in a trusted zone to send e-mail. We expect 
to provide this controlled access using application proxies. These proxies act as secure 
intermediaries—evaluating the request from the device, gathering the information from 
the resource in a trusted zone, and passing it to the device.
Selective Zones
Selective zones provide more protection than untrusted zones. Examples of services in 
these zones include applications and data accessed by contractors, business partners, 
and employees, using client devices that are managed or otherwise provide a level of 
trust. Selective zones do not contain critical data or high-value Intel intellectual property. 
Several selective subzones provide access to different services or users.
Trusted Zones
Trusted zones host critical services, data, and infrastructure. They are highly secured 
and locked down. Examples of services within these zones are administrative access to 
data center servers and network infrastructure, factory networks and devices, enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) applications, and design engineering systems containing 
intellectual property. Accordingly, we might only allow direct access to these resources 
from trusted systems located within the enterprise network, and all access would be 
monitored closely to detect anomalous behavior.
At Intel, we have implemented secure high-trust zones as part of our transition to an 
enterprise private cloud. Implementing these zones was a key step in allowing us to move 
several categories of application onto virtualized cloud infrastructure, including internal 
applications requiring high security, as well as externally facing applications used to 
communicate with business partners. The security features in these trusted zones include 
application hardening and increased monitoring. We continue to add further security 
capabilities over time.
NeW SeCUrItY arChIteCtUre IN aCtION: a DaY IN 
the LIFe OF aN eMpLOYee
this example (illustrated in Figure 7-3) describes how the new security architecture 
enables the intel sales force to access the information they need in the course of 
a day. at the same time, the architecture protects intel’s security by dynamically 
adjusting the level of access provided, based on the user’s device and location, and 
by monitoring for anomalous behavior.
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the employee travels to a customer site. the employee is using a personal 
smartphone with limited security features and so is allowed access only to services 
in untrusted zones. From here, the employee can view limited customer information, 
including recent orders, extracted from an enterprise resource planning (erp) 
system in a trusted zone—but only through an application proxy server, which 
protects the trusted zone by acting as an intermediary, evaluating information 
requests, accessing the erp system, and relaying the information to the user.
if a smartphone requests an abnormally large number of customer records—an 
indication that it may have been stolen—further access from the smartphone is 
blocked. to help understand the reason for the anomalous access, there is increased 
monitoring of the employee’s attempts to access the system from any device.
the employee reaches the customer site and logs into the enterprise network 
from a company-owned mobile business pC. Because this device is more trusted, 
the employee now has access to additional capabilities available in selective 
zones, such as the ability to view pricing and create orders that are relayed by an 
application proxy to the erp system in a trusted zone.
Figure 7-3. The new security architecture dynamically adjusts the user’s access to 
information, based on factors such as the user’s device and location. Source: Intel 
Corporation, 2012
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the employee returns to the company’s office and connects to the corporate 
network. Now the employee is using a trusted device from a trusted location and 
has direct access to the erp system in a trusted zone.
Balanced Controls
Over the past decade, enterprise security has focused heavily on preventative controls 
such as firewalls and intrusion prevention systems. This approach offers clear benefits: it 
is less expensive to prevent an attack than to correct problems after one has occurred, and 
it is easy to see when firewalls have successfully prevented an attempted compromise.
However, the new security model requires that we balance preventative controls with 
detective (monitoring) and corrective controls, for several reasons.
First, the focus of the new model is on enabling and controlling access from a wider 
range of users and devices, rather than on preventing access. Second, the continually 
changing threat landscape makes it necessary to assume that compromise will occur; 
all preventative controls will eventually fail. Once attackers have gained access to the 
environment, the preventative controls they have bypassed are worthless.
By increasing the use of detective controls and implementing more aggressive 
corrective controls, we can mitigate the risk of allowing broader access. These controls 
also increase our ability to survive and recover from a successful attack.
USING SeCUrItY BUSINeSS INteLLIGeNCe tO  
DeteCt SUSpICIOUS BehaVIOr
like any large organization, intel has experienced security issues involving both 
external attackers and insiders, including attempts to steal intellectual property. as 
we’ve investigated, we have identified markers and indicators that are frequently 
associated with these events. we realized that if we had been able to spot these 
indicators sooner, we could have responded and mitigated the threats more quickly.
Security business intelligence is a key technology that we can use to detect 
suspicious behavior as the environment becomes more complex and attackers 
become more adept at concealing compromises. analytical tools automate the 
process of analyzing large volumes of data to detect and monitor anomalous activity, 
allowing us to detect problems that we might otherwise miss.
these capabilities are similar to those already implemented by financial institutions 
to prevent fraudulent credit-card transactions, and by online consumer services to 
prevent theft of user data. Banks monitor access attempts and online transactions 
to determine whether to trust the user’s identity and whether to allow the user’s 
activity. if the user is trying to transfer a large sum to an external account, the bank’s 
systems may compare the transaction with the user’s previous behavior to see if it 
appears to be abnormal. to mitigate risk, the bank may delay large transfers so it 
can perform additional analysis and inform the account owner by e-mail.
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in a similar way, we can use security business intelligence—analysis and correlation 
of data gathered by monitoring—to analyze patterns of behavior. this can detect 
and thwart possible attacks.
on a large scale, logging data generated by servers and sensors across the network 
can be collected into a database for analysis. at intel, we are using analytic tools 
to correlate this aggregated data and flag anomalies for further investigation. For 
example, if traffic within a server cluster becomes abnormally high, it might indicate 
that a botnet is exploiting one of the servers to broadcast traffic across the web.
Security business intelligence can also be applied at the level of individual users and 
devices. at intel, we’re implementing monitoring technology that tracks users’ logins 
and access attempts, as i described in Chapter 5. our strategy is to make login 
information available to users so that they can help to spot unauthorized access 
attempts.
in the future, i envisage that the system could analyze users’ historical behavior 
patterns to determine how to respond when users request access to resources. the 
system could compare the request with the user’s previous actions: what have you 
done before, and is this request consistent with those behaviors or is it an anomaly 
and therefore suspicious? if the request appears consistent with previous behavior, 
the system would pass the request to the trust calculation; if it appears anomalous, 
the system might deny the request and alert the security team.
within intel, we have also deployed a dashboard that provides granular information 
about infected clients and servers, boosting our ability to intervene quickly and 
accurately. Due to our efforts to detect and remove malware before infections 
occur, we achieved a 33 percent reduction in malware impacts in 2011, despite 
experiencing a 50 percent increase in the number of variants (intel 2012a). we also 
plan to add a predictive engine that enables proactive protection and simulations 
that can improve our ability to respond to threats.
The balance between preventative, detective, and corrective controls will vary, 
depending on the security zone. In high-trust zones, we implement extensive monitoring 
to detect possible attempts to steal data or compromise critical systems. Redundancy 
within each type of control can be used to provide additional protection.
The following includes possible examples of using detective and preventative controls:
An Intel employee attempts to send a confidential document •	
to a non-Intel e-mail address. Monitoring software detects the 
attempt, prevents the document from being sent outside the 
firewall, and asks the Intel employee if he or she really intended 
to do this. If the employee confirms that this was intended, the 
document may be transmitted—or if the document is highly 
sensitive, a redacted version may be sent.
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Inappropriate use of a document protected with enterprise rights •	
management technology results in revocation of access to the 
document.
The system allows access to specific documents but tracks the •	
activity. A user can download a few documents without causing 
concerns. However, if the user attempts to download hundreds 
of documents, the system slows down the speed of delivery (for 
instance, only allowing ten to be checked out at a time) and alerts 
the user’s manager. If the manager approves, the user is given 
faster access.
The detection of an infected system places the system on a •	
remediation network, isolating the system and restricting access 
to enterprise information and applications. The system may 
retain some ability to access corporate assets, but all activity is 
closely logged to enable incident response if necessary.
When a system is found to be compromised, we examine all its •	
recent activities and interactions with other systems. Additional 
monitoring of those systems is automatically enabled.
Users and Data: The New Perimeters
The concept of balanced controls also extends to the protection of users and data. 
Traditional network security boundaries are dissolving with the proliferation of new 
devices and users’ expectations that they should be able to access information from 
anywhere at any time. Users are under direct assault from a barrage of attacks designed to 
trick them into taking actions that can compromise the information on their devices or on 
enterprise systems. These trends mean that we need to think more broadly about how we 
protect information, as well as the users of this information.
While we continue to implement enterprise network controls, such as perimeter 
defenses and the detective controls described earlier, we need to supplement these 
controls with a focus on the users and on the primary assets we are trying to protect such 
as intellectual property. The new architecture therefore expands our defenses to two 
additional perimeters: the data itself and the users who have access to the data.
Data Perimeter
Important data should be protected at all times—when it is created, stored, and 
transmitted. This becomes increasingly challenging as we move data to more and more 
devices and let more people access it. How do we protect information when it’s located 
outside the physical perimeter on a personal device?
At Intel IT, we’re implementing technologies that closely integrate protection with 
high-value data so that the data remains protected as it moves to different devices and 
locations. Technologies, such as enterprise rights management and data leak prevention, 
can be used to watermark and tag information so that we can track and manage its use. 
With enterprise rights management, the creator of a document can define exactly who 
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has access rights throughout the life of the document and can revoke access at any point. 
Data loss prevention is used to tag documents, track their movements, and prevent 
transfer outside the organization if necessary.
User Perimeter
As I described in Chapter 5, people are part of the security perimeter, and we need to treat 
them as such. Users can become security risks for a variety of reasons. They are targeted 
more frequently in social engineering attacks, and they are more vulnerable to these 
attacks because their personal information is often readily available on social networking 
sites. They may also click malicious links in e-mail, download malware, or store data on 
portable devices that then are lost.
At Intel, we’ve found that a combination of training, incentives, and other activities 
can help instill information security and privacy protection into the corporate culture 
and successfully encourages employees to own responsibility for protecting enterprise 
and personal information. We’ve seen our efforts pay off, with employees calling the 
help desk or sending e-mail alerts when they notice something that doesn’t seem right. 
As discussed in the sidebar (“Using Security Business Intelligence to Detect Suspicious 
Behavior”), our strategy also includes making account access logs available to users so 
that they can help spot unauthorized access attempts.
Conclusion
This chapter describes a new architecture designed to support the Protect to Enable 
mission. Its goal is to allow faster adoption of new services and capabilities while 
improving survivability. At Intel, we believe that this architecture can be used to meet a 
broad range of evolving requirements, including new usage models and threats. Because 
of this, we are working to ingrain this model into all aspects of Intel IT, from development 
to operations. We’ve already used aspects of the architecture to provide solutions to 
challenging use cases, while actually reducing risk. For example, we’ve been able to 
move important internal and Internet-facing applications to a private cloud by utilizing 
high-trust zones. We’ve successfully used various approaches to protect the user and data 
perimeters. We also used balanced controls and trust zones to enable network access 
from employee-owned devices. In some cases, projects have seen their security overhead 
decrease by adopting this model.
I believe that the architecture could provide similar value to other organizations 
facing similar challenges. By publishing information about the architecture, we hope to 
encourage others to take advantage of this architecture wherever it meets their needs. 
We also hope that making this information available will stimulate more discussion and 
ideas, and that others will build on these concepts to create further innovations that 
benefit all of us.
